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Get this from a library! Saídas de emergência em edifícios: NBR [ Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas.]. NBR – Saidas de emergencias em edificios.?NBR maio AVALIACAO DO SISTEMA DE ILUMINACAO EM ESCADAS. Thamirys Luyze. dos. Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1, pages National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch as.

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Concentration and Profit Rates: New Evidence on an Old Issue

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Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement

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This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving competitively, taking a set of taxes as given.

Concentration and Profit Rates: New Evidence on an Old Issue

Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers. General contact details of provider: The equilibrium allocations depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international nnbr and the income from capital investment in their countries.

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Competitive Equilibria With Limited Enforcement

New Evidence on an Old Issue In: For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael Gort Rao Singamsetti. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the “citations” tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

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RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers. The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations. Concentration and Profit Rates: It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about. When requesting a correction, please mention this item’s handle: Explorations in Economic Research, Volume 3, number 1.

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